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USED CAR DEALERS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE
MAJOR KNOWN DEFECTS
In spring 1982, Congress blocked adoption of the Used Car Rule
proposed by the Federal Trade Commission. The rule would have
required that a used automobile dealer provide a written list of
major defects which the dealer knew existed in a car offered for
sale. This Comment will examine the rule, the reasons for its pro-
posal by the FTC, and the objections which led to its eventual
congressional veto. This Comment suggests that the traditional
fraud cause of action be expanded to include nondisclosure of
major defects by used automobile dealers.
INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 1982, Congress vetoed' the proposed Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Used Car Rule.2 The rule would have re-
quired used car dealers to place informational stickers in win-
dows of used autos.3 These stickers would have disclosed certain
"major" mechanical defects the dealer knew existed in the car
and would have explained the relevant warranty provisions ac-
companying the sale. The FTC adopted the rule after extensive
research and compromise. 4 The congressional veto was the prod-
1. 128 CONG.REc. 2856-83 (daily ed. May 26, 1982). The disapproval was au-
thorized under the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a-1 (Supp. IV 1980). The FTC Used Car Rule was the first rule challenged
under the legislative veto provision of the Act. This veto provision was itself later
challenged and ruled unconstitutional; however, the constitutionality of the legis-
lative veto provision and therefore the effectiveness of the FTC Used Car Rule are
uncertain due to a pending appeal. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, United States Senate
v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1982) (No. 82-935); United States House of
Representatives v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1982) (No. 82-1044).
2. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,359-68 (1981) (was to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 455) (proposed Aug. 14, 1981).
3. Id. at 41,360-65.
4. See HR. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-16 (1981) (statement of Patri-
cia P. Bailey, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission).
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uct of cursory congressional review5 and dealer association lobby
misinterpretation of the rule.
This Comment reviews the reasons underlying the FTC's adop-
tion of the Used Car Rule and attempts to answer the objections
which led to its congressional veto. Several problems confront
the purchaser of a used automobile: for example, "as is" sales,
which negate implied warranties and a remedy in contract, are
prevalent in the used auto industry. Further, although dealers
are usually familiar with the condition of the cars they dffer, the
average buyer lacks the mechanical skill to detect many defects.
This knowledge disparity unfairly places a serious economic risk
upon the "as is" used auto purchaser. A statute similar to the
FTC rule, requiring that dealers disclose major known defects,
would best solve this problem. Yet, the recent veto demonstrates
that such enactment may be politically difficult.6 Negligence law
currently requires that dealers disclose "dangerous defects" they
know exist in cars they offer for sale. An analogous disclosure
duty can be found in several states' requirements that realty ven-
dors disclose facts materially affecting a property's value which
the seller knows exist and the purchaser cannot readily detect.
This Comment suggests that this expansion of disclosure respon-
sibility be applied to used car dealers through a fraud cause of
action.
THE FTC USED CAR RULE
FTC Studies and Proposals Preceding the Rule
Extensive research and several proposals preceded the FTC's
adoption of the Used Car Rule. In 1975, under congressional man-
date, 7 the FTC initiated rulemaking proceedings concerning used
auto warranty provisions and practices. The rulemaking commit-
tee held public hearings in six major cities during 1976 and 1977.8
5. The House waived the normal three-day post-proposal "layover" and lim-
ited debate to one-fifth the normal time provided. 128 CONG. REC. 2856-83 (daily
ed. May 26, 1982); see also 127 CONG. REC. 14,889-90 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1981).
6. Wisconsin, however, has enacted similar requirements through adminis-
trative regulation. Wisconsin section MVD 24 requires dealers to inspect each ve-
hicle before sale, using "reasonable diligence" in a "Walk-around and interior
inspection, under-hood inspection, under-vehicle inspection and test drive." The
types of defects the dealer is required to disclose are limited to those expensive to
repair. WIs. ADJOIN. CODE § MV) 24.03(5) (a) (1974).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1976).
8. Hearings were held in Boston, Cleveland, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco and Washington, D.C. Most witnesses were either dealers, representatives
from dealer organizations, state or local government officials, or legal aid attor-
neys; relative few consumers testified. Interviewers included Commission staff
members, dealer representatives and consumer group members. The final tran-
script contained 8,232 pages. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE
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The Commission sanctioned several research reports9 and re-
ceived 1,681 additional comments from interested parties. 10
The committee's 1978 report" stated the industry's major con-
sumer abuses12 were dealer misrepresentation and non-disclo-
sure regarding the dealer's post-sale warranty responsibilities, 13
and mechanical condition at time of sale.' 4 The staff recom-
mended a rule' 5 requiring dealers to: (1) inspect cars for mechan-
ical defects; (2) disclose defects and estimate resultant repair
costs; (3) list previous owners and known repairs; and (4) explain
warranty provisions in writing.
The FTC rejected this proposal,16 as well as a subsequent rule
which would have established "voluntary inspections."17 Mean-
while, Congress expressly discouraged the FTC from imposing
mandatory used auto warranties or inspections. 8 In the fall of
1981, six years after rulemaking proceedings were authorized, the
Commission finally adopted the "known defects rule" which Con-
COMMISSION, SALE OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES, FINAL STAFF REPORT TO THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE (Sept. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL STAFF REPORT].
9. See id. at 19-37. These reports include: CENTER FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RETAIL USED MOTOR VEHICLE MARKET; AN EVALUA-
TION OF DISCLOSURE AND REGULATION; NATIONAL ANALYSTS, INC., REPORT ON A
SURVEY OF BUYERS OF USED CARS; SURVEY RESEARCH LABORATORY, BELIEFS AND
EXPERIENCES OF DISSATISFIED PURCHASERS OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES (1976); Au-
TOMOBILE CLUB OF MISSOURI, STUDY REGARDING THE CONDITION OF VEHICLES
PURCHASED AS USED CARS (1977); CALIFORNIA STATE AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, STUDY RE-
GARDING THE CONDITION OF VEHICLES PURCHASED AS USED CARS (1977); CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, A CALPIRG STUDY: PRACTICES IN THE USED MO-
TOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY (1977).
10. These comments included letters from consumers, state and local law en-
forcement officials, legal aid attorneys, consumer groups, dealer associations,
rental and leasing associations, members of Congress and other federal agencies.
H.R. REP. No. 417, supra note 4, at 7.
11. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8.
12. The staff contended that many of these practices violated the Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), which prohibits unfair competi-
tive practices. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
13. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9, 248-91.
14. Id. at 6-7, 38-71.
15. Id. at app. F.
16. H.R. REP. No. 417, supra note 4, at 8.
17. The proposed rule would not have required dealer inspection; however,
should dealers choose to inspect, they would be obligated to disclose the results of
such inspection. In her congressional testimony, FTC Commissioner Bailey stated
that the Commission rejected this rule because it wished to avoid any "inspection"
requirements in a used auto rule. Id.
18. .R. REP. No. 181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979).
gress eventually defeated.1 9
The proposed FTC rule would have prohibited affirative mis-
representation by dealers, while requiring dealer disclosure re-
garding warranty provisions and certain known defects.20 The
rule was designed to enhance consumer knowledge regarding a
used automobile's mechanical condition and warranty coverage.
The rule would have given the FTC a cause of action against a
dealer who affirmatively misrepresented defects or warranty pro-
visions. 21 Dealers would also have been required to place infor-
mational stickers in windows of used autos.22 The stickers would
(1) warn buyers that oral warranties were often unenforceable, 23
(2) advise buyers that they may and should seek third party (pro-
fessional) mechanical inspection before purchase, (3) provide
warranty terms and explain effects of "as is" sales clauses,24 and
(4) list major defects known to the dealer. The rule provided a
$10,000 maximum fine for a single violation.25
Objections to the FTC Rule
The greatest opposition came from auto dealer associations. 2 6
The dealers contended that the rule's requirements were exces-
sive and would increase used car prices and shift sales.
Dealers specifically objected to the defect disclosure require-
19. The Commission stated that its authorities for adopting this regulation
were the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1976), and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
20. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981).
21. Such action is presumably within the Commission's authority under the
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
22. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,359-62 (1981).
23. The Commission had found that, oftentimes, dealers orally reassure buy-
ers that the dealer would repair cars which subsequently develop mechanical
problems despite written warranty waivers. Purchasers appeared unaware of the
distinction between oral and written promises. See infra text accompanying notes
60-61.
24. The Commission found, "[tihe record demonstrates conclusively that
many motor vehicle purchasers are unaware, at the time of sale, of the true nature
and extent of their responsibility for repairs after the sale has been consum-
mated." FiNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 261 (studies showed between 25-59
percent of "as is" purchasers were unaware of the effect of such a waiver).
25. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,344 (1981).
26. See Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256 Before Subcomm. on Commerce,
Tourim, and Transportation of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Thomas Green, Executive Director of Legislative Af-
fairs, National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), and statement of Joseph
Eikenburg, President Emeritus, National Independent Auto Dealers Association)
[hereinafter cited as Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256]. NADA is one of the five
largest association political action committee contributors to 1982 congressional
campaigns. Of the approximately $950,000 contributed, $40,750 went to members of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Running the the PACs, TiME, Oct. 25,
1982, at 20, 21.
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ment.27 The proposed sticker listed fifty-two possible "major de-
fects."28 The rule required dealers to list any of these problems
they knew existed.29 The rule imputed to the dealer or his agent
such knowledge if he had "obtained facts or information about
the condition of a vehicle which would lead a reasonable person,
under the circumstances, to conclude that the car contained one
or more of the fifty-two defects listed."30 Dealer associations con-
tended the "knowledge" definition was vague and imposed con-
structive knowledge upon dealers.31 They warned that the rule
would effectively require dealers to inspect thoroughly all used
autos sold.32 Additionally, they claimed those dealers aware of
mechanical problems would further be required to investigate the
specific listed defect that caused the problem.33 The associations
contended these inspections would increase used car prices by as
much as $100 per car.3 4
The dealers' interpretation was too broad and inconsistent with
the rule's language. The rule stated: "You are not required to in-
spect .... ,"35 Studies and practical sense indicate most dealers
are familiar with their cars' mechanical conditions. 36 Admittedly,
actual knowledge is difficult to prove, particularly in the fraud
area. Yet such difficulty has not prohibited "actual knowledge"
components in other statutes. 37 Nevertheless, the FTC rule ex-
27. 128 CONG. REC. H2856-83 (daily ed. May 26, 1982).
28. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,361 (1981).
29. Id. at 41,366.
30. Id. at 41,362.
31. Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256, supra note 26 (statement of Thomas
Green).
32. Id.
33. Id. (statement of Thomas Green). Congressional opponents also feared
that the sticker's partial disclosure would lull the consumer into a false sense of
security. That is, consumers would presume that the listed defects were the car's
only mechanical problems. 128 CONG. REC. H2859 (daily ed. May 26, 1982) (state-
ment of Rep. Lent). Yet, the sticker face read. 'The defects must be disclosed if
known .... However, there may be defects that are unknown to the dealer. If
nothing is listed, the car is not necessarily free of defects." FTC Used Car Rule, 46
Fed. Reg. 41,360 (1981).
34. Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256, supra note 26 (statement of Joseph
Eikenburg); see also infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
35. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,366 (1981).
36. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 71-75, 81-83.
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1824(5) (1976) (requiring horseshow management to
disqualify any horse which the management knows is sore); 15 U.S.C. § 1411(1)
(1976) (requiring that an auto manufacturer who "obtains knowledge that any mo-
tor vehicle ... manufactured by him contains [safety] defect[s]" must inform the
FTC and the auto's owners, purchasers and dealers); 7 U.S.C. § 2044(b) (6) (1976)
403
pressly limited dealer responsibility to "obtained facts and infor-
mation" and required the FTC to prove such actual knowledge. 38
This language, coupled with statements by FTC Commissioner
Patricia Bailey,39 indicate that the intent of the rule was not to re-
quire dealers to conduct additional inspections nor to impose con-
structive knowledge upon dealers. 4 0 Commissioner Bailey
testified that the rule would only require dealers to disclose the
general problem without requiring them to discover the specific
cause.4 1
Noting this rule would affect only commercial dealers, critics
warned that resulting higher prices would cause a market shift
from dealers to private sales,42 causing economic difficulty within
the already troubled auto industry.4 3 But studies showed dealers
were much less likely than private sellers to disclose known de-
fects.44 Furthermore, there is no evidence dealership prices
would increase dramatically.45 In fact, such disclosure require-
ments may shift sales to dealers, by assuring purchasers that
they are being fully informed.
Critics, who fear further regulation will irreparably harm the
troubled auto industry, fail to note used car sales are actually in-
(prohibiting a farmer from recruiting, employing, or utilizing "with knowledge, the
services of an alien not lawfully admitted for permanent residence").
38. FTC Used Car Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,362 (1981). An appendix to the rule
cited several illustrations of situations where the dealer would be charged with
knowledge of a defect. Id. at 41,368.
39. H.R. REP. No. 417, supra note 4, at 8-11.
40. Even if dealers felt compelled to make thorough inspections, the dealers'
$100-250 cost estimates appear excessive. See infra note 45.
41. H.R. REP. No. 417, supra note 4, at 11-12. The Commissioner's examples in-
cluded, 'This car leans to the right," and "Oil leaks from the bottom." She stated
the specific cause, within the 52 listed defects, need not be discovered. Id.
42. Dealers feared the FTC rule would cause a rise in dealer retail prices, as
well as a decline in the price that dealers were willing to pay private sellers.
These predictions were based upon an assumption that the rule would make
dealer inspection necessary. Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256, supra note 26
(statement of Joseph Eikenburg).
43. Id. at 9-10.
44. FmNuA STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 116-25.
45. Interim Hearings on Consumer Protection in the Sale of New and Used
Cars Before the California Assembly Comm. on Labor, Employment and Consumer
Affairs (Dec. 14-15, 1979) (testimony of Richard A. Elbrecht, Supervising Attorney,
Legal Services Unit, California Division of Consumer Affairs) (on file with author)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Consumer Protection ]. It is estimated that even
thorough inspections would cost dealers between $25-50 per auto. Id. (quoting
Robert N. Wiens, Chief of the Bureau of Automotive Repair).
Wisconsin currently requires that dealers inspect used cars for major mechani-
cal defects. Wis. ADnma. CODE § MVD 24.03(5)a (1974). FTC Commissioner Bailey
states surveys indicate most Wisconsin dealers inspect used autos no more thor-
oughly now than they did before the requirement was established. HR. REP. No.
417, supra note 4, at 11; see also FMNA STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 213-29.
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creasing, despite the decline in new car sales. 46 Many used car
dealers cannot even find enough cars to satisfy current market de-
mand.47 There is no reason to believe defect disclosure require-
ments would devastate this flourishing industry.48 Objections to
the Used Car Rule, mainly brought by dealer associations, were
based upon overly broad interpretations of the rule.49 These inter-
pretations were expressly negated by the rule's language and
reassurances by the FTC Commissioner. 0 Special interest lobby-
ing, rather than the general public's disapproval, caused the veto.
The defeat perpetuates current abuses against consumers caused
by inadequate consumer information.
A HARSH CONSUMER REALITY WARRANTS IMPOSING A DUTY TO
DISCLOSE KNOWN USED CAR DEFECTS
Growing consumer reliance upon the used car market,5' cou-
pled with the significant increase in used car prices, 2 mandate re-
evaluation of used auto consumer protection.53 A complete lack of
product uniformity makes used auto purchases highly risky. Fur-
thermore, unequal mechanical sophistication between consumers
and dealers leaves the former vulnerable to abuse by the latter.54
46. See generally Lots of Action-A Used Auto Bonanza Helps Niew-Car Deal-
ers Survive Their Slump, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 1. The article notes the
used auto industry was one of the forces escalating the government's consumer
price index, although prices are half those of new cars. Hertz Corporation esti-
mates a record 18.7 million used cars were sold in the United States in 1980, com-
pared with 8.9 million new cars sold in the same year. Industry reports estimate
used auto prices increased 31 percent between January and September 1981.
Some late models actually increased in value during that year, despite being a
year older.
47. Id.; Cars That Keep Their Value Best, Money, Aug. 1982, at 54.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 85-90.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
50. Id.
51. The used automobile is increasingly becoming the purchaser's main trans-
portation source. H.R. REP. No. 417, supra note 4, at 25. The poor rely heavily
upon the used auto market, yet are the most likely to encounter warranty waivers.
FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 249.
52. Lots of Action-A Used Auto Bonanza Helps New-Car Dealers Survive
Their Slump, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, coL 1.
53. The California Department of Consumer Affairs receives more consumer
complaints about used auto sales than any other business activity. Hearings on
Consumer Protection, supra note 45. The FTC rulemaking committee found that
the major abuses suffered by used auto buyers involved dealer misrepresentation
and dealer nondisclosure regarding mechanical condition and warranty coverage.
FRNA STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 7, 248.
54. Hearings on Consumer Protection, supra note 45. In California implied
"As is" clauses are common in the used auto industry. While
implied55 or express5 6 warranties may protect some purchasers of
used autos, many consumers are unaware that the "as is" clause
often completely waives implied warranties.S7 Over one-half of
American used car sales are "as is."58 Legal aid attorneys report
that most, if not all, of their low-income clients who purchase ve-
hicles from dealers do so "as is."59 Despite the widespread use of
"as is" clauses, many buyers of used autos do not realize their se-
rious effect.60 This misperception is often supplemented by the
dealer's oral reassurances that "if anything goes wrong, just bring
it in and we'll take care of it."61 Consumers often do not discover
the legal significance of "as is" clauses or reassurances by the
dealer until expensive repairs become necessary.62
These unforeseen repair costs can financially devastate the un-
prepared purchaser. The FTC rulemaking report found that many
warranties are established when express warranties are provided. Song-Beverly
Act, CAi. CIV. CODE § 1793 (West Supp. 1978); see also CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1792.3-.5(West 1973), 1795.5 (West Supp. 1982). Yet, absent express warranties, used prod-
uct sales usually do not carry implied warranties in California. See Lamb v. Otto,
51 Cal. App. 433, 197 P. 147 (1921); Schratz, Are There Implied Warranties on Used
Cars in California?, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 539 (1975); Annot., 22 A.LR. 3D 1387 (1968).
Yet note in Drumar Mining v. Morris Ravine Mining Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 492, 92
P.2d 424 (1939), the court held an implied warranty of fitness accompanied the sale
of used mining machinery when the seller knew the buyer's intended use and the
buyer relied on the seller's representations, with no opportunity to adequately in-
spect the machinery.
55. FmNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. Uniform Commercial Code war-
ranty provisions usually apply to used product sales. See generally 67 Am. JuR. 2D
Sales § 478 (1973); Annot., 22 A.LR. 3D 1387 (Supp. 1982).
56. FNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 248. See generally Annot., 36 A._.R
3D 125 (1971).
57. Section 2-316(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that the term
"as is" can eliminate all implied warranties. Absent express warranties, dealers
selling cars "as is" are not legally responsible for post-sale repairs. See generally
Annot., 24 A.L.R. 3D 465 (1969). Yet, recognizing unequal vendor-vendee bargain-
ing power and the ominous effect of warranty waivers, courts have displayed re-
luctance in eliminating implied warranties. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (declared new car warranty
waiver invalid citing unequal bargaining power and the general public welfare);
see also Fairchild Ind. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 186, 333 A.2d 313,
316-18 (1975); Overland Bond Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 L1. App. 3d 348, 350, 292
N.E.2d 168, 174 (1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153
Ind. App. 31, 50-55, 286 N.E.2d 188, 196-99 (1972).
58. Hearing on H. Con. Res. 254 & 256, supra note 26.
59. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 249.
60. Id. at 262-65. Surveys indicated between 25-59 percent of used auto buyers
did not understand the clause's true effect. Buyers often believe the clauses only
refer to accessories or that the dealer will not further recondition the car. Id.
61. Id. at 274-77.
62. Id. at 279-80. One survey indicated, "twenty-eight percent of used car buy-
ers who believed at the time of sale that their cars were somehow warranted (or
were not sure) reported learning later that the sale was really 'as is."' Id.
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used autos develop mechanical problems soon after purchase.
63
This indicates that most defects existed at the time of sale,64 yet
less than one-tenth of buyers surveyed believed their car was in
bad or very bad condition when they bought it.65 These defects
are not minor. The FTC Staff Report noted Northern California
State Auto Association diagnostic tests revealing that dealer-of-
fered used cars in 1977 contained an average of $162.89 per car in
defects.6 6 The overall price purchasers pay for their cars includes
these repair costs.
Buyers usually possess little or no expertise regarding the mod-
em automobile's complex machinery.67 They usually do not dis-
cover hidden defects until post-purchase problems arise.68
Although buyers will cursorily check under the hood and take
short test drives, 69 these "inspections" are almost meaningless
considering the purchaser's lack of expertise and the salesman's
distractions and reassurances. 70 Used car buyers, as a group, in-
dicate mechanical condition is their main purchasing considera-
tion.71 Yet most buyers make purchasing decisions without
adequate mechanical information.72 Dealers universally invest
considerable money in cosmetic work or "detailing"73 to hide or
63. Surveys indicated between 35-45 percent of all used autos display defects
within one month of purchase. The same surveys indicate 56-68 percent develop
defects within two months. These unforeseen defects are particularly prevalent in
cars purchased by low income buyers. Id. at 38-57.
64. Id. at 38.
65. Id. at 48 (citing NATIONAL ANALYSTS, INc., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF BUYERS
OF USED CARS).
66. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 53. Missouri Auto Club records indi-
cated an average $235.64 in defects per car diagnosed. Id.
67. Id. at 83-87. Unlike most modern consumer items, the used car is a non-
standardized product. Information such as make, model and mileage only address
generalities regarding the average car after average use. Yet, actual prior use,
maintenance and accident record render every used auto unique and specific de-
fects unpredictable. Even buyers' guides merely provide generalities.
68. Id. at 86-87.
69. Id. at 84-90.
70. Id. at 84-87.
71. Id. at 102.
72. Hearings on Consumer Protection, supra note 45 (testimony of Richard A.
Elbrecht); see also FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 84.
73. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-01. Studies show external ap-
pearance usually affects buyers more than actual mechanical soundness. The un-
trained buyer often fallaciously equates the two. Id Not only are buyers misled
by the "detailing," but they end up paying the bill for these cosmetic repairs. Pro-
fessional detailers often charge over $50 per car. Hearings on Consumer Protec-
tion, supra note 45.
distract the purchaser's attention from the actual mechanical con-
dition. If dealers were required to disclose known defects, more
money could be used repairing these defects, rather than drawing
buyer attention away from them.
Fewer than half of the purchasers of used automobiles seek an
expert's advice when buying a used car.7 4 The low income pur-
chaser, typically an "as is" buyer, is the least likely to seek expert
advice.75
Dealers know the general mechanical condition of the cars they
sell. Whether acquiring the car in dealer-to-dealer auctions 76 or
from private individuals,77 a competitive dealer must understand
the car's mechanical condition to make his best buy. He knows a
car's defects and uses this knowledge later against the retail pur-
chaser. This knowledge serves as the rationale for a dealer's sell-
ing a car "as is." Dealers often receive further defect information
through independent inspections by "warranty insurers."78
Should insurance inspectors find too many mechanical defects,
they will not warrant the car. These cars are then sold "as is."79
Despite their superior ability to detect mechanical defects, used
car dealers are understandably reluctant to disclose these de-
fects. 8 0 Dealers generally represent autos as being in "good" or
"very good" condition, but these oral promises are usually unen-
forceable.81 When dealers do disclose specific defects, they are
usually minor and obvious, implying no major problems exist.82
Results of one survey determined that purchasers who were
warned of specific major defects encountered fewer post-sale re-
74. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 93-95 (citing NATIONAL ANALYSTS,
INC., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF BuYERs OF USED CARs). Factors contributing to this
low figure include expense, uncertain mechanic reliability, inconvenience and
dealer reassurances.
75. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 93-97, 103-13.
76. Most dealer auctions require sellers to fully disclose any known defects.
All sales are revocable upon subsequent inspection by purchaser-dealers. Id. at
71.
77. Dealers employ professional appraisers to test-drive and inspect autos
before they purchase these cars. The appraisers are widely recognized as experts
at identifying defects upon brief inspection. Id. at 72-75.
78. Id. at 81.
79. Sellers are often aware of defects in cars which they resell after repossess-
ing them. Buyer defaults are often caused by overburdensome repair bills. Many
dealers, such as car rental and leasing agencies, are intimately familiar with the
car's repair history. Id. at 81-83.
80. Id. at 112-30. One survey found 58 percent of dealers told purchasers the
auto had been inspected, yet only 15 percent acknowledged any defects existed.
Id. at 114.
81. Id. at 113 (survey found that dealers represented 94 percent of the cars
they offered as being in "good" or "very good" condition).
82. Id. at 108.
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pair problems than those who were not.83
The current market does not encourage disclosure. Honest
dealers lose sales to dishonest dealers who do not rely upon re-
turn sales. These dishonest dealers will not disclose an automo-
bile's true condition; in fact, these dealers will use general
statements to reassure buyers of mechanical soundness. 84 Be-
cause buyers lack the knowledge necessary to distinguish honest
from dishonest claims, these dealers are rewarded.
Although used autos are not uniform products, prices are cur-
rently based upon averages, because buyers cannot evaluate
them individually.85 Automobiles in the same categories of
model, year and mileage are priced similarly. These prices are
based upon consumer expectations regarding average previous
wear.86 The averages, reflected in wholesale prices, discourage
owners of well-kept autos from selling to dealers. 87 Dealer disclo-
sure of defects would create prices that more accurately reflect an
auto's value.88 More disparate and accurate pricing would en-
courage sale of well-kept autos by private owners to dealers and
improve the quality of dealer-marketed cars.
Dealers should disclose major mechanical defects they know
exist in the used cars they offer. Current knowledge disparity be-
tween buyer and dealer creates unequal bargaining power and
prices that do not accurately reflect an auto's value. If buyers
were more familiar with the used auto's condition and "actual
cost," they could make more informed decisions. They could also
negotiate prices that more accurately reflect true value89 and
purchase cars they could realistically afford after repair costs.
Furthermore, increased consumer knowledge would also en-
83. Id. at 115 (survey found that 30 percent of the purchasers informed of de-
fects experienced post-sale problems, whereas 40 percent of unwarned purchasers
experienced mechanical trouble).
84. Id. at 132.
85. See supra note 26.
86. FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 133-36.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 67-70.
89. Id. Surveys showed that when purchasers are informed of major mechani-
cal defects, approximately 70 percent asked dealers to repair the defect before
purchase, often accepting a price increase in return. Yet, some buyers may prefer
a defective car at a reduced price, as a "fixer-upper." Id. at 65-69; see also AuTOMo-
BILE CLUB OF MISSOURI, STUDY REGARDING THE CONDITION OF VEHICLES PURCHASED
AS USED CARS (1977); CALIFORNIA STATE AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, STUDY REGARDING THE
CONDITION OF VEHICLES PURCHASED AS USED CARS (1977).
courage dealers to focus pre-sale expenditures on repairing de-
fects rather than hiding them.
Dealers argue that "as is" auto purchasers are receiving dis-
counts because they are willing to "take a gamble." But they fail
to note that used auto prices are increasing as more consumers
look to the industry for their primary transportation source. 90 De-
spite dealers' concerns, there is no reason to believe that requir-
ing known-defect disclosure would raise used auto prices
significantly. To the contrary, dealer disclosure would attract
higher quality cars into the dealer market.
These bargaining inequities between purchasers of used cars
and dealers now make legal reform imperative. Legislative or ad-
ministrative enactments similar to the FTC rule would appear to
be the optimal solution because of their definitive and documen-
tary character. Yet, such action appears politically infeasible de-
spite its popular appeal. In view of this legislative standstill, it is
now incumbent on the judiciary to protect the consumer through
the expansion of common law theories. In particular, courts could
extend liability for nondisclosure based on a fraud cause of
action.
EXPANSION OF LBIi.rY THROUGH A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION
Courts traditionally adhere to the general rule that mere non-
disclosure is not fraud.91 Vendors are required to disclose a prod-
uct's material hidden defects only when (1) the vendor/purchaser
relationship is fiduciary, or (2) the vendor's affirmative state-
ments would be misleading absent such disclosure.9 2 These lim-
ited rules, unfortunately, have not cured used auto dealer/
purchaser inequities 93 because courts have failed to find that ven-
dor/purchaser transactions involving used cars fit within either of
these two exceptions to the general rule. Despite buyer reliance
upon dealer knowledge,94 the normal used auto dealer/buyer rela-
90. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
91. Stone v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55, 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976);
Wiechman Eng'rs v. California, 31 Cal. App. 3d 741, 751-52, 107 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535
(1973); Zanbetiz v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 MI1. App. 2d 192, 201, 219 N.E.2d 98,
103 (1966). Fraud traditionally includes the following elements:
A representation was made as a statement of fact, which was untrue and
known to be untrue by the party making it, or else recklessly made; that it
was made with intent to deceive and for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it; and that he did in fact rely upon it and was thereby to
act to his injury or damage.
AIm. Jun. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 12 (1968).
92. See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 106, at 696 (4th ed. 1971).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 51-90.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 67-84.
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tionship has not been characterized as fiduciary.95 Further, a
dealer's general representations regarding overall quality may not
always establish a duty to disclose specific defects; 96 this is gener-
ally a question of fact. This "half truth" distinction creates a
dealer manipulation scenario: a dealer will say enough to reas-
sure buyers, yet avoid making statements which would create a
full disclosure duty. That is, many dealers completely avoid ad-
dressing a car's trouble areas. 97 Thus, under current law, a half-
truth imposes fraud liability, while complete nondisclosure does
not.
Absent special relationships or affirmative representations,
courts are recognizing that a vendor may be required to disclose a
product's material defects which the purchaser is not competent
to detect 8 California courts, among others,99 have carved out a
95. One party's dependence upon the other's superior knowledge may estab-
lish a fiduciary relationship. See generally 37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 16
(1968). Yet a thorough search disclosed no case holding that a used auto dealer
owes such a duty to a used auto purchaser.
96. See, e.g., Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d 801 (1950) (dealer not liable
in fraud for representing that used auto was in good condition but not disclosing
the car's defective brakes); Roby Motors Co. v. Cade, 158 So. 850 (La. Ct. App.
1935) (used truck sold "as is" placed purchaser on notice of all defects, despite
seller's alleged assurances that the truck was in generally good mechanical condi-
tion); Randall v. Smith, 136 Ga. App. 823, 222 S.E.2d 664 (1975) (dealer's represen-
tations that a used car was in "good condition" were merely the salesman's
"puffing" and statements of opinion). But see Edwards v. Port AMC/JEEP Inc.,
337 So. 2d 276 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (even though sale was "as is," representation
that the used car had been checked and was in sound condition was fraudulent
when a serious transmission defect was later discovered); Neil Huffman Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Ridolphi, 378 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1979) (dealer liable in fraud for fail-
ing to disclose $2,000 in major defects after representing car was in good condition
with only minor damage). See also Ford Dealer's Ass'n v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
32 Cal. 3d 347, 650 P.2d 328, 185 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1982). The California Supreme Court
overturned an injunction against enforcement of administrative regulations hold-
ing dealers liable for "misleading" statements made by salespersons to prospec-
tive purchasers. The court also held that the Department of Motor Vehicles may
define certain types of statements as inherently misleading. The regulation re-
quired dealers to disclose a used car's prior use as a rental vehicle or taxi cab.
The court held that a failure to so disclose would be misleading.
97. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
98. W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 697-98 (4th ed. 1971).
99. See, e.g., Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (realty
seller must warn purchaser that house suffers termite infestation); Crum v. Mc-
Coy, 41 Ohio Misc. 34, 322 N.E.2d 161 (1974) (vendor had duty to warn buyer that
property lacked adequate water, supply, despite "as is" sales clause and buyer's
inspection of premises); Hauben v. Harmon, 605 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1979) (held that
Florida state law required vendors to disclose material facts not readily discovera-
ble by the buyer). See generally Annot., 8 AJ.R. 3D 550, 559 (1966).
specific exception to the general rule in the context of realty
sales. A realty vendor has an affirmative duty to disclose material
facts to his vendeelOO any breach of that duty constitutes fraud.1O1
When a realty seller knows facts materially affecting a property's
value or desirability and also knows that "such facts are not
known to, or within the reach of the diligent... observation of
the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose [these facts] to
the buyer."l0 2 When a seller's failure to disclose induces buyer
action, the vendor is liable in fraud.10 3 Neither an "as is" clause' 0 4
nor a buyer's actual inspection'05 will discharge this duty. This
disclosure duty should be extended to used auto sales where buy-
ers lack the knowledge or skill necessary to make intelligent
purchasing decisions. Used auto purchasers require and deserve
no less protection than do realty purchasers. 0 6
100. Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963) (seller's
agent must disclose building is in a "state of disrepair" despite contract clause
stating buyer took property "in its present state and condition"); Clauser v. Tay-
lor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941) (realty sale rescinded where vendor did
not disclose that house rested on filled land); Orlando v. Berkeley, 220 Cal. App. 2d
224, 33 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1963) (realty vendor required to disclose termite infestation,
although no affirmative statements were made regarding termites).
101. Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
102. Id. at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
103. Id. at 737-38, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06.
104. In Lingsch, the sales contract, signed by all parties, stated the buyer took
the property "in its present state and condition" and "no representations, guaran-
tees or warranties of any kind or character have been made ... which are not
herein expressed." Id. at 733, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The court held such clauses gen-
erally mean "the buyer takes the property in the condition visible to or observable
by him." The clause did not excuse the vendor's disclosure duty. The court stated
that their interpretation "not only makes good sense but equates sound law with
good morals." Id. at 740-43, 29 CaL Rptr. at 208-09; see also Crawford v. Nastos, 182
Cal. App. 2d 659, 6 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1960) ("as is" clause only meant the purchaser
accepted the land "as seen by her"); Orlando v. Berkeley, 220 Cal. App. 2d 224, 33
Cal. Rptr. 860 (1963) (neither "as is" clause nor specific waiver of termite clearance
excused vendor's duty to disclose termite infestation or damp rot); CAL. Cry. CODE
§ 1663 (West 1973) (stating liability for fraud may not be contractually excused).
Contra Driver v. Molene, 11 Cal. App. 3d 746, 90 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1970) ("as is" sales
clause, coupled with purchaser's exceptional skill and experience, relieved seller's
duty to disclose concurrent condemnation proceedings regarding property sold).
105. See, e.g., Oakes v. McCarthy Co., 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127
(1968) (buyer's inspection did not excuse vendor's duty to disclose that house
rested upon filled land, despite no purchaser inquiries).
106. California courts have recognized this need for protection in the case of
odometer misreadings. An action for fraud may lie where a dealer knew, or should
have known, that his representations as to the mileage of the car were false, and
that the representations were made to induce the purchase of the car. Munchow
v. Kraszewsld, 56 Cal. App. 3d 831, 835, 128 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (1976) (finding made
even though dealer expressly disclaimed any warranty or representation as to the
accuracy of the mileage on the odometer).
One court has extended protection in another area. See Liebergesell v. Evans,
93 Wash. 2d 881, 887-88, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176-77 (1980) (held that a borrower had a
duty to inform the lender that a proposed interest rate was illegal and that, absent
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A used car dealer's liability under a fraud theory should be ex-
panded to include nondisclosure of major defects for the same
reason that tort liability presently exists for dealers who fail to
disclose dangerous defects-the purchaser's inability to detect
such defects. The Restatement of Torts requires that a vendor
who knows his product contains dangerous defects must so in-
form buyers.107 This warning need only be given if the seller has
reason to believe the buyer will not discover the defects. Vendors
failing to disclose defects are liable in tort for resultant injuries.108
In recognizing that used car purchasers normally lack adequate
mechanical skill, courts consistently apply this duty to used car
vendors. 0 9 The vendor's disclosure duty is based upon the fore-
seeability that purchasers will not discover mechanical defects
which the dealer can detect." 0 Still, this duty is limited to defects
which cause accidents and liability is limited to resultant injuries.
This reasoning should be extended to all major mechanical de-
fects. Although no threat to physical safety may be involved, the
economic loss for uninformed buyers may be great. As in other
areas of tort law, an actionable harm should not be limited to
physical injury."'
a fiduciary relationship, a duty to disclose relevant information could be implied
by a contractual duty to deal in good faith); see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
108. Id.
109. Johnson v. Ernest G. Beaudry Motor Co., 170 F. Supp. 164 (D.C. Ga. 1958);
Hembree v. Southard, 339 P.2d 771 (Okla. 1959); Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio
St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
110. Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
Most states also require that dealers reasonably inspect used cars for safety de-
fects. See, e.g., id.; Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 49 Ohio Op. 402, 110
N.E.2d 419 (1953); Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952); see also WIs.
ADMIN. CODE § MVD 24.03(5) (6) (a)2 (1974); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301 (McKin-
ney 1970).
111. Pure economic loss is becoming more widely recognized as an actionable
harm under a negligence cause of action. See, e.g., Fentress v. Van Etta Motors,
157 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958) (awarded recovery against an auto
manufacturer based on a negligence claim resulting from safety defects which
caused damage to the automobile itself only); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377
P.2d 884, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (awarded negligence recovery based on a finding
of negligence against the contractor for not properly testing soil which caused
damage to the house, depreciating its value; award was for depreciation only);
J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (restau-
rant operator recovered damages in negligence due to a contractor's unnecessary
delay in finishing the construction work ordered even though restauranteer was
not a party to a construction contract); see also Rabin & Grossman, Defective Prod-
ucts or Realty Causing Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory of Recovery, 12
Sw. U.L. REV. 4, 31-35 (1981) (suggests recovery under a theory of negligence for
Even the use of an "as is" clause often will not discharge a
dealer's duty to disclose latent, dangerous defects.112 In
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.,113 the Montana Supreme
Court held an "as is" clause did not relieve a used car dealer's
duty to detect and disclose steering defects. The court found that
the dealer would have discovered the defect if he had conducted a
reasonable safety inspection, and held that although the "as is"
clause effectively waived implied warranties, it did not make the
buyer's ignorance regarding the defect and the resulting injury
any less foreseeable.114
Some courts base negligence liability in an "as is" clause con-
text on its finding of what the buyer intended to accept "as is." In
Turner v. International Harvester Co.,115 a used truck's weak
frame collapsed and crushed the purchaser two years after
purchase. In an action for negligence and strict liability, the court
held that a jury could determine which defects the parties in-
tended to be excused by the "as is" clause."16 This emphasis
upon purchaser intent demonstrates the courts' reluctance to al-
low "as is" clauses to impose constructive knowledge of defects
upon used auto buyers."17
In some instances, the use of an "as is" clause may waive negli-
gence liability regarding certain defects if vendor/buyer mechani-
cal skill and knowledge is substantially equal. In Stapinski v.
Walsh Const. Co., Inc.,"18 a construction company sold a used
truck "as is" to a private security company. The company's
economic damage to personal property should not be limited to damage caused by
violent occurrence). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3D 683, 690-94 (1967) (citing
cases affording buyers a negligence claim against manufacturers resulting from
defects caused by product deficiency alone).
112. See Mulder v. Casho, 61 Cal. 2d 633, 394 P.2d 545, 39 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1964)
(presence of an "as is" clause did not relieve the dealer's statutory duty to sell an
automobile with safe brakes).
113. 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
114. Id. at 675, 679; see also Flemming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash.
2d 465, 423 P.2d 926 (1967), in which the Washington Supreme Court stated that an
"as is" clause seems to prima facie disclaim warranties but does not excuse a
dealer's duty to disclose latent, dangerous defects. The defendant seller did not
warn the buyer, a used car dealer, that the car would start in any gear. When the
buyer's employee accidentally started the car in "drive," the car lurched forward
and crushed the plaintiff. The court held that, despite the purchaser's extensive
mechanical knowledge, the seller had reason to believe he would not have the op-
portunity to detect this type of defect before it created a danger.
115. 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
116. Id. at 281, 336 A.2d at 66. The court stated that the parties could have in-
tended the clause to cover all defects, only safety defects, or only those not discov-
erable upon the buyer's inspection and test drive. Id. at 287, 336 A.2d at 73.
117. FiNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 262-65 (surveys indicate used auto
buyers are often unaware of even the warranty-waiver effect of an "as is" clause).
118. 395 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. 1979).
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agents inspected the truck before the purchase and performed
monthly maintenance work on the trucks, including grease work.
The truck had a loose grease fitting at the time of purchase which
caused an accident fifteen months later. The court held that the
"as is" clause excused the seller's duty to discover and disclose
the defect because the seller was not a used car dealer and the
purchaser had ample, perhaps superior, opportunity to discover
the defect." 9
Negligence law recognizes Ithe unequal mechanical skill be-
tween the used auto dealer and purchaser. This recognition cre-
ates a dealer's duty to inspect cars for safety defects and disclose
those he finds to purchasers. Absent exceptional purchaser
knowledge, an "as is" clause will not put the purchaser on notice
of these defects. Yet, the dealer's liability is currently limited to
defects which actually cause physical injury and property
damage.
The foregoing demonstrates that consumers commonly suffer
considerable injury because they cannot determine a used car's
overall mechanical condition before purchase. Recognizing the
seriousness and scale of the used auto problem, courts should ex-
tend the dealer's disclosure duty to all known major defects, not
just dangerous defects. This requirement would place no addi-
tional burden upon used auto dealers and would benefit both the
market and individual consumers.
CONCLUSION
The FTC Used Car Rule was proposed to remedy serious mar-
ket problems caused by unequal understanding between used
auto purchasers and dealers. The rule was defeated because the
used auto industry misinterpreted its requirements and exagger-
ated its potential effect. Used auto purchasers remain seriously
underinformed and unprotected, particularly those who purchase
"as is." The "as is" purchaser should better understand the con-
dition of a car when he buys it so he may bargain a reflective
price and more realistically understand the total cost. The courts
should recognize the used auto purchaser's exceptional vulnera-
bility, as they have with realty purchasers. Considering the used
auto dealer's current disclosure duty under negligence due to
119. Id. at 1252-54.
their familiarity with the condition of the cars they offer, requir-
ing that he disclose all known major defects would not be an un-
reasonable extension. Failure to disclose should now constitute
actionable fraud.
DOUGLAS DEXTER
